Lucky Spyder Spitfire Board Install – Imagine

January 19, 2011


Detailed instructions on how to install the Lucky Spyder Spitfire Board Install in an Imagine electronic paintball marker.

Bullhead City Flight Club on board camera

April 21, 2010


First flight of the DYNAM HAWK SKY 4ch sold by www.nitoplanes.com flown by NEVADA GHOST in Bullhead City, Az

NTSB Animation of Marlin Air Cessna Citation Accident Investigation Near Milwaukee Wisconsin

January 17, 2010

Video courtesy: NTSB

Washington, D.C. – The National Transportation Safety Board today determined that the probable cause of an aircraft that lost control and impacted water was the pilots’ mismanagement of an abnormal flight control situation through improper actions, including lack of crew coordination, and failing to control airspeed and to prioritize control of the airplane.

On June 4, 2007, about 4:00pm CST, a Cessna Citation 550, N550BP, impacted Lake Michigan shortly after departure from General Mitchell International Airport, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (MKE). The two pilots and four passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was being operated by Marlin Air under the provisions of Part 135. The aircraft was carrying a human organ for a transplant operation in Michigan. At the time of the accident, marginal visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the surface, and instrument meteorological conditions prevailed aloft; the flight operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

Due to the lack of a data recording system, the Board could not determine the exact nature of the initiating event of the accident. However, the evidence indicated that the two most likely scenarios were a runaway trim or the inadvertent engagement of the autopilot, rather than the yaw damper, at takeoff.

The Board further noted that the event was controllable if the captain had not allowed the airspeed and resulting control forces to increase while he tried to troubleshoot the problem. By allowing the airplane’s airspeed to increase while engaging in poorly coordinated troubleshooting efforts, the pilots allowed an abnormal situation to escalate to an emergency.

Therefore, the NTSB concluded that if the pilots had simply maintained a reduced airspeed while they responded to the situation, the aerodynamic forces on the airplane would not have increased significantly. At reduced airspeeds, the pilots should have been able to maintain control of the airplane long enough to either successfully troubleshoot and resolve the problem or return safely to the airport.

Contributing to the accident were Marlin Air’s operational safety deficiencies, including the inadequate checkrides administered by Marlin Air’s chief pilot/check airman, and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) failure to detect and correct those deficiencies, which placed a pilot who inadequately emphasized safety in the position of company chief pilot and designated check airman and placed an ill-prepared pilot in the first officer’s seat.

Results from the Board’s investigation indicated that the captain did not adhere to procedures or comply with regulations, and that he routinely abbreviated checklists. Subsequently, the NTSB concluded that the pilots’ lack of discipline, lack of in-depth systems knowledge, and failure to adhere to procedures contributed to their inability to cope with anomalies experienced during the accident flight. Thus, the Board also concluded that Marlin Air’s selection of a chief pilot/check airman who failed to comply with procedures and regulations contributed to a culture that allowed an ill-prepared first officer to fly in Part 135 operations.

The report adopted today by the Board, points out that FAA guidance regarding appointment of check airmen requires Principal Operations Inspectors (POI) to verify the check airman candidate’s “certificates and background.” Additionally, all required training must be completed, and the airman’s training records must show satisfactory completion of initial, transition, or upgrade training, as applicable. The guidance does not specifically address POI actions when the background evaluation discloses negative information. This lack of guidance can result in the appointment of check airmen who do not adhere to standards and who possibly jeopardize flight safety.

As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board issued recommendations to the FAA, and the American Hospital Association regarding airplane and system deficiencies, FAA oversight, and the safety ramifications of an operator’s financial health.

A summary of the findings of the Board’s report is available on the NTSB’s website at:http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2009/AAR0906.htm

Duration : 0:3:34

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Flying Floats 1973 Vintage FAA Aviation Training Film

August 3, 2009

Flying Floats 1973 Vintage FAA Aviation Training Film

Duration : 0:19:13

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Wake Turbulence Avoidance – A Pilot and Air Traffic Controller Briefing 1995

July 23, 2009

Vintage Federal Aviation Administration training film.

Courtesy: public.resource.org

Wake Turbulence Avoidance – A Pilot and Air Traffic Controller Briefing AVA19661VNB1, 1995

Video production using re-enactments and animation to illustrate the hazards and physical dynamics of wake turbulence caused by aircraft.

http://www.ntis.gov/search/product.aspx?ABBR=AVA19661VNB1

Duration : 0:24:16

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How Airplanes Fly 1968 Vintage Aviation Training Film

July 16, 2009

Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

How Airplanes Fly
NTIS AVA08357VNB1

What makes an airplane get off the ground and stay in the air? Easy to understand film combines animation and live sequences to explain … all » basic aerodynamics. Forces of lift, weight, thrust and drag are shown in relation to flight.

Duration : 0:18:30

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Colgan Flight 3407 NTSB Animation of Buffalo Accident Q400

May 18, 2009

Courtesy: National Transportation Safety Board

The NTSB.GOV website keeps going down, so here’s the animation.

This three-dimensional (3-D) animated reconstruction shows the last 2 minutes of the February 12, 2009, accident involving a Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, operated by of Colgan Air, Inc., which crashed about 5 nautical miles northeast of Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York, while on an instrument landing system approach to runway 23. During the approach, a pitchup motion occurred, followed by a left roll and then a right roll. During these maneuvers, both the stick shaker and stick pusher were activated, and the speed decreased. After further pitch and roll excursions, the airplane entered a steep descent from which it did not recover.
The animation shows excerpts from the flight data recorder (FDR), the pit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, recorded radar data, and aircraft performance data. It does not depict the weather or visibility conditions at the time of the accident. The animation does not include audio.
The upper portion of the animation shows a 3-D model of the airplane and the airplanes motions during the accident sequence. In this area, selected content from the CVR transcript or other annotations are superimposed as text at the time that the event occurred. All times (in eastern standard time) are shown on the right side of the screen.
The lower portion of the animation depicts instruments and indicators, which display selected FDR or calculated parameters. The instruments and indications are shown in three sections, which are (from left to right):
•Airspeed, airspeed tape, low speed cue, attitude indicator showing pitch and roll attitude, altitude, altitude tape, rate of climb, and heading;
•Stick shaker and stick pusher indicated as text, control wheel/column icon depicting the control wheel (rotating right or left) and control column (moving up or down) inputs, and an indicator showing rudder pedal inputs; and
•The power lever and condition lever as indicators, the flap handle selection as an indicator, and auto pilot status and gearhandle position indicated as text.
Excerpts from CVR transcript:
22:15:06.3       HOT-1    flaps five.?22:15:08.1       HOT-2    what??22:15:08.8       HOT-1    flaps five please.?22:15:13.5       APP        Colgan thirty four zero seven three miles from KLUMP turn left heading two six zero maintain two thousand three hundred until established localizer. cleared ILS approach runway two three.?22:15:22.2       RDO-2   left two sixty two thousand three hundred til established and cleared ILS two three approach Colgan thirty four zero seven.?22:15:31.7       HOT-1    alright approach is armed.?22:15:32.8       HOT-2    roger.?22:16:04.1       HOT-1    gear downlocs alive.?22:16:06.4       APP        Colgan thirty four zero seven contact tower one two zero point five. have a good night.?22:16:11.5       RDO-2   over to tower you do the same thirty four zero seven.?22:16:21.2       HOT-2    gears down.?22:16:23.5       HOT-1    flaps fifteen before landing checklist.?22:16:26.6       HOT-2    uhhh.?22:16:37.1       HOT-2    I put the flaps up.?22:16:42.2       HOT-1    [grunt]?22:16:45.8       HOT-2    should the gear up??22:16:46.8       HOT-1    gear up.?22:16:50.1       CAM       [increase in ambient noise]?22:16:51.9       CAM       [thump]

Duration : 0:2:39

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